

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.340
19 October 1967
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FORTIETH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 19 October 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

(United States of America)

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES

Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Mr. J. NOGUEIRA FILHO

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL

Mr. J.R. MORDEN

Mr. A. BERNIER

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

Mr. N. KRISHNAN

Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCIOLO

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mr. E. FRANCO

Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO

Mr. B.O. TONWE

Poland:

Mr. A. CZARKOWSKI

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO

Mr. O. IONESCO

Mr. C. GEORGESCO

Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM

Mr. T. WULFF

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. M.V. ANTYASOV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. O. SIRRY

Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Mr. I.F. PORTER

Mr. M.E. HOWELL

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. S. DePALMA

Mr. G. BREAM

Mr. A.F. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the 340th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. KHALLAF (United Arab Republic) (translation from French): On 26 September the delegation of the United Arab Republic made a statement (ENDC/PV.333) concerning the two draft treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/192, 193). That statement gave rise to comments by some delegations, whom we wish to thank for the interest they have shown in it and for the care they have taken and are still taking in the study of our proposals. To maintain this fruitful dialogue, my delegation deems it useful to submit in greater detail some of the views which it upheld in its previous statement. Today I shall deal with two important points: loop-holes, and the assurances to be given to non-nuclear States against any use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons against them.

3. To begin with loop-holes, we would point out at once that the General Assembly, in its resolution 2028 (XX), requested us to negotiate a treaty which ---

"...should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form". (ENDC/161)

That directive is clear and categorical. It does not lend itself to varied interpretations. Therefore, if there is any loop-hole, this Committee is bound to eliminate it.

4. In the opinion of the delegation of the United Arab Republic, the submitted text opens certain opportunities for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In fact, under article I of the two draft treaties the nuclear States, whose number today is known and limited undertake --

"...not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices."

(ENDC/192, 193)

5. But, while that is so for the nuclear States, the non-nuclear States, although an increasing number of them are potentially capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, are

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exempt from any such obligation. It could very well happen that a non-nuclear country party to the treaty, having certain aggressive designs and taking advantage of certain favouring international conditions, might assist another non-nuclear country not party to the treaty to obtain nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly, as was pointed out by the representative of Canada at our meeting of 12 October, that State "would be acting counter to the whole intent and purpose of the non-proliferation treaty."

(ENDC/PV.338, para. 9)

6. However -- and this is of capital importance --, such a State might assert that it had not violated the letter of the treaty, arguing that if the treaty had really wished to establish such a commitment for all parties, nuclear and non-nuclear, it would certainly have done so explicitly. But it has done so only for the nuclear countries.

7. This has been called a theoretical loop-hole, of no practical significance. Let us first point out that the importance of the distinction between theoretical and practical is entirely relative and changes with the circumstances of time and place. Then one might ask, if that argument is true, why such a loop-hole, supposed to be theoretical, is eliminated by article I of the treaty. My delegation is convinced that, unless this loop-hole were eliminated, the day would come when a country acting in bad faith or having aggressive designs would use that loop-hole, thus threatening the peace of other countries.

8. To guard against such a possibility, the delegation of the United Arab Republic has borrowed the very language of article I, namely the wording on which the sponsors of the two drafts have reached agreement, and proposes that that formula be added to article II. My delegation neither asks nor desires to re-open the discussion on the two articles. All we wish is to eliminate an obvious and dangerous loop-hole.

9. In order to reassure us, the representative of Canada tells us that any State using that loop-hole --

"...would indeed be subject to international censure and, one hopes, effective corrective measures by the permanent members of the Security Council". (ibid.)

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But if that were so, why have the other loop-holes eliminated by the proposed treaty not been treated in like manner? Can this international censure, which is necessarily vague and would have only a certain moral effect, really be considered adequate in the circumstances? As for the punitive measures which Mr. Burns suggests that the permanent members of the Security Council might take, we would point out that in law and practice they can only be taken in virtue of a very clear and well-defined text.

10. Moreover, in my statement of 26 September I stressed the need for each country party to the treaty to take --

"...appropriate measures to ensure that no private, public or semi-public person, company, enterprise or body subject to its jurisdiction and engaged in nuclear activities participates in any act prohibited by this article".

(ENDC/PV.333, para. 9)

This is not the first time that my delegation has raised this point. On 3 March 1966 it pointed out to the Committee that the effectiveness of such a treaty --

"...may also depend to a large extent on the way it is observed by persons, companies, firms or other private, public or semi-public bodies engaged in nuclear activities. The activities of such persons or bodies may afford a kind of loop-hole impairing the effectiveness of the treaty. This question should be studied and the responsibilities of the contracting parties towards their nationals in this field established." (ENDC/PV.245, p.10)

Despite that express mention by us, the two submitted drafts have disregarded this point.

11. The representative of Canada, speaking of article I, considers that --

"...the existing language of the article implicitly covers any practical problems that might arise concerning the activities mentioned in the amendment.." (ENDC/PV.338, para. 7)

But he does not explain how and on what grounds the present wording would cover those problems even implicitly.

12. Unfortunately the delegation of the United Arab Republic does not share the conviction of the representative of Canada on that point. It may be feared, in fact, that the application of the treaty, according to its present wording, will be limited to

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governments and thus exclude other legal entities, private or public, engaged in the manufacture or transfer of nuclear weapons. The fate of such an important treaty should not be exposed to the hazards of divergent interpretations or of differences between national legal systems. This is all the more true because we all know the great part played in the field of conventional and nuclear armaments by certain companies, firms or other bodies which as such are independent of the State. It should also be pointed out that a measure such as that which we suggest here is fairly current practice. In fact, in international treaties of this nature it is often considered necessary to oblige the signatories to take the necessary measures for their execution.

13. My delegation also proposed in its Working Paper that in article I the words "in any form whatsoever" should be added (ENDC/197). Our purpose was to make that article clearer, more precise and less liable to future divergent and erroneous interpretations. Some doubt might in fact remain whether all forms of transfer are covered by the mere undertaking which article I now expresses not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We are convinced that the General Assembly felt the need to state explicitly in its resolution 2028 (XX) that nuclear weapons should not be proliferated "directly or indirectly ... in any form" precisely because it felt the same doubt. Since the General Assembly has thus approved the usefulness, nay the necessity, of making this explicit mention in its resolution, the same mention should be made with all the more reason in the text of the treaty which we are now preparing.

14. With regard to the guarantees to be given to the non-nuclear States against any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them, our Committee has been able to appreciate the importance attached to these by most delegations. The co-Chairmen, in presenting their draft treaties, recognized both the importance and the urgency of this matter. They have informed us that they mean to continue their talks on it in order to find a positive solution for submission to our Committee when considering the treaty.

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15. My delegation considers that any acceptable solution of this problem requires study both of the substance and of the form to be given to it. As for the substance, my delegation would recall that the wording it has submitted (ENDC/197) comes mainly and directly from paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2153 (XXI) (ENDC/185). Thus there is no doubt either that the substance, of our wording is generally approved, or that our wording is very moderate and realistic. In submitting it, we hope that it will constitute a sound basis for our negotiations.

16. As for the form to be given to this matter, we still believe that the best procedure would be to devote to it an express provision in the treaty, in view of the very special importance for both nuclear and non-nuclear countries of the point relating to guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons. It should also be noted that the inclusion of such a provision would certainly help to give the treaty its much desired balance.

17. The delegation of Canada, however, sees the solution of this question of form differently. It suggests either unilateral declarations by the nuclear countries which will remain outside the treaty, or the adoption of a resolution in that sense by the United Nations. But such a form does not appear to us appropriate. It is obvious that only a provision incorporated in the treaty could achieve the desired degree of effectiveness and obligation.

18. Mr. ECOBESCO (Romania) (translation from French): The presentation to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 24 August of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the form of two identical texts (ENDC/192, 193) has already given the delegations here an opportunity of making a general survey of the document before us. The debates which have taken place so far can be said to have been marked by quite a proliferation of ideas, approaches, suggestions and amendments concerning ways and means of solving the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

19. We have before us specific proposals and precise formulations of texts regarding both the form and the content of the non-proliferation agreement. A draft article III

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of the treaty was submitted to the Committee on 30 August by the Swedish delegation (ENDC/195). A working paper containing some amendments and additions to the draft was submitted by the Mexican delegation on 19 September (ENDC/196). On 26 September another working paper containing suggestions for incorporation in the draft treaty was submitted by the delegation of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/197). The Conference also has before it some valuable considerations, suggestions and proposals put forward during that same period by many delegations, among which I would mention the delegations of Burma, Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Italy and Nigeria.

20. All these interventions, which proceed from a constructive spirit of sincere co-operation, seem to us to show -- apart from attachment to the idea of non-proliferation -- that the present draft treaty does not yet meet all the requirements of a just and equitable agreement, and to testify to a concern to amend, supplement and improve the original text. The proposals before the Conference constitute veins of true metal which the Eighteen-Nation Committee -- the negotiating forum -- is bound to work on with care, patience and tenacity in order to give the agreement the corrections which it absolutely needs. On 3 October the head of the Swedish delegation Mrs. Myrdal, pointed out to the Committee that "We now find ourselves with an avalanche of suggestions and amendments worthy of profound scrutiny." (ENDC/PV.335, para. 3)

21. The Romanian delegation has had the opportunity to set forth in detail the position of Romania in regard to the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.334). We have informed the Committee, quite frankly, of the point of view of the Romanian Government concerning the main components of the agreement which we are called upon to negotiate. At this stage of our work, when the treaty is being studied and prepared on the basis of specific texts, we consider it our duty also to make our contribution.

22. The Romanian delegation, upon instructions from the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania, has the honour to submit officially a working paper (ENDC/199) containing amendments and additions to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of

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nuclear weapons. I shall now read out this document. I should like to explain that, in order to make it easier to understand this text, we have in numbering the paragraphs of the preamble regarded as the first paragraph the one beginning with the words: "The States concluding this Treaty...".

"PREAMBLE"

1. After the third paragraph, introduce a new paragraph:

'Recognizing that the danger of a nuclear war can be eliminated only by the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and the destruction of all existing stockpiles of such weapons and of the means of their delivery'.

2. At the end of the fourth paragraph, add the following provisions:

'...based on the following principles:

- (a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;
- (b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;
- (c) The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament;
- (d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty;
- (e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories'.

3. Replace the present fifth preambular paragraph by the following text:

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'Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities in accordance with the bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded by them'.

4. After the sixth paragraph, insert a new paragraph:

'Affirming the absolute right of all States, whether they possess nuclear weapons or not, to undertake research on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, both now and in the future, on the basis of equality and without any discrimination'.

5. In the ninth paragraph:

Replace the words 'declaring their intention' by the words 'expressing their determination'.

After the words 'through appropriate international procedures', add the words: 'accepted by all States signatories to the Treaty'.

6. In the twelfth preambular paragraph, after the words 'in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons', amend the text to read: 'the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, and to achieve eventually the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.'

ARTICLE III A

1. 'The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty undertake to adopt specific measures to bring about as soon as possible the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery'.
2. 'If five years after the entry into force of this Treaty such measures have not been adopted, the Parties shall consider the situation created and decide on the measures to be taken'.

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ARTICLE III B

'Nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty solemnly undertake never in any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons'.

ARTICLE IV

After the words 'use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes', add the words 'on a basis of equality'.

ARTICLE V

Delete the second sentence of paragraph 2 and replace it by the following text:

'The amendment shall enter into force, for every Party having deposited its instruments of ratification thereof, upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency'.

2. After paragraph 3, insert a new paragraph:

'4. Such conferences shall be convened thereafter periodically every five years, to review the manner in which the obligations assumed by all Parties to this Treaty are carried out.'

ARTICLE VII

Delete the last sentence of this article, beginning with the words 'Such notice shall include...'

23. It is not my intention to make today a detailed presentation of the working paper I have just read out. We propose to fulfil that pleasant duty during our later interventions. However, we should like to take this opportunity to explain the main ideas contained in our document, and also the reasons for the Romanian proposals and the foundations on which they rest. Here, first of all, are the main ideas to which the document gives expression.

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24. The first category relates to the inclusion, in the preamble to the non-proliferation treaty, of the fundamental requirements laid down by the United Nations General Assembly in its well-known resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161). These co-ordinates, which relate to the very essence of the treaty, are reproduced word for word in our proposals.
25. A second category has the purpose of placing the treaty in the complex framework of measures designed to lead to the accomplishment of nuclear disarmament. We should like in this connexion to point more particularly to the proposal which defines the duty of the nuclear Powers to undertake specific disarmament measures and is intended to give the non-proliferation treaty substance, vigour and durability.
26. Then there are provisions intimately linked with the question of the guarantees to be given to States not possessing nuclear weapons. When we speak of "guarantees", we are guided essentially by the legitimate concern of all countries and all peoples to enjoy an enhanced degree of security. That is the noble purpose pursued by the Romanian proposal under which the countries possessing nuclear weapons will have to assume through the non-proliferation treaty the formal undertaking never in any circumstances to use nuclear weapons against States which do not possess and will not acquire nuclear weapons, and not to threaten them with the use of thermonuclear weapons.
27. Another group of provisions which we wish to see incorporated in the treaty relates to the need to assure access for all States, on a basis of equality and without any discrimination, to the achievements of science and nuclear technology. Every State has an incontestable right to undertake research and to carry out programmes designed to place nuclear energy at the service of its progress and many-sided development. Restrictive or ambiguous forms of words concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would merely raise grave doubts and justified misgivings in the non-nuclear countries. At the same time it seems quite natural that the non-nuclear countries should also consider the usefulness of the non-proliferation treaty in the light of the prospects which it would open up for real international co-operation in this field.
28. Lastly, the document submitted by our delegation contains proposals designed to improve the text of the draft treaty in order to ensure an effective verification of the manner in which the obligations assumed by States parties to the treaty are fulfilled, the procedure for amending the treaty, and the modalities for withdrawal from the treaty. The convening of periodic conferences to consider whether and how

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the parties to the treaty fulfil their obligations constitutes a factor stimulating the fulfilment without fail of the letter and spirit of the treaty by both nuclear and non-nuclear States. Our proposals concerning amendment of the treaty and the conditions for withdrawal reflect a specific application of the principles governing the whole law of treaties and, above all, the principles of the sovereignty and equality of States.

29. That is all we wish to say for the present about the main ideas contained in our document. I should now like to deal with the reasons on which the Romanian proposals are based.

30. We should like to stress, first of all, that the proposals which we have submitted today to the Eighteen-Nation Committee spring from the unshakable desire and resolve of the Romanian Government and people to fight actively for the strengthening of peace and international security and to contribute to the solution of the international problems at present confronting mankind, including those of disarmament. In that spirit we consider that it is the duty of all States, whatever their size and strength, to persevere in efforts to tackle constructively and solve, with patience and an enhanced sense of their responsibility, the many complex problems of disarmament and above all of nuclear disarmament.

31. We are convinced that in searching for workable solutions to international problems, and indeed to any other question in any activity at all, it is necessary to start from the facts, from the fundamental realities of life. That is a truth which also applies with full force to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we wish to draw up a lasting document, and if we are determined not to establish a fragile instrument which might easily become unsteady or collapse, we must at all costs powerfully anchor it in reality. That being so, we could not even tackle, let alone solve, the problem of non-proliferation in isolation from the setting of which it is an integral part: the process of general disarmament and, more particularly, of nuclear disarmament.

32. Those are the reasons why we continue to maintain that the non-proliferation treaty must form part of a chain of measures designed to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, to stop their manufacture and completely to eliminate their existing stockpiles. In short, all this action must represent a prefiguration of the ultimate aim: the liberation of mankind from the spectre of a nuclear holocaust.

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33. We are certain that the Romanian proposals, if incorporated in the non-proliferation treaty, would close serious gaps in the draft before us and implicitly bring the non-proliferation treaty into complete concordance with the main objective -- nuclear disarmament.

34. Since the non-proliferation treaty faithfully reflects the realities of the world of today, it not only cannot disregard the fundamental principles governing relations between States but must necessarily be based on them. The fundamental postulates of strict respect for national sovereignty, equality of rights and non-intervention in the affairs of other States must be the foundation of this treaty. One does not sacrifice principles; they cannot be sacrificed. They must be respected and defended.

35. Equal security for all States, large or small, nuclear or non-nuclear; equitable mutual obligations for all without any exception; advantages for all countries based on equality and non-discrimination; exclusion of any element which might constitute a pretext for interference in the internal affairs of States; respect for the interests of all States and consideration for the positions which they defend -- these are the commandments deriving, for the non-proliferation treaty, from the paramount principles of law and justice.

36. The problem of non-proliferation, which is now the subject of advanced negotiations in the Committee, affects both the vital interests of States and those of the whole international community. Would unjustified haste or insufficient study of the views expressed by various delegations make it possible to arrive more easily at the positive results which, we do not doubt, all the States represented here desire? That is a question which calls for profound reflection.

37. The Romanian delegation considers that now, more than ever, the views of all participants must be taken into account, so that our negotiating body may be a true crucible blending together the positions and interests of all States. Only thus can an effective, equitable, non-discriminatory and stable treaty be drafted, a treaty which can meet the legitimate preoccupations of each and all. For, according to an old saying, no one ever sees so clearly into the affairs of others as the person whom they affect the most.

38. The non-proliferation treaty, which we conceive as an instrument for improving the international situation and for promoting peace, should in no way establish privileges on one side and overload the other side with obligations. On the contrary, it should satisfy the aspirations and interests of all countries.

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39. Mr. Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, said in a statement on the foreign policy of the Socialist Republic of Romania that he made in the Grand National Assembly on 24 July:

"The non-proliferation of atomic weapons should lead to the elimination of the division of the world into nuclear and non-nuclear countries, to the strengthening of equality among States, and to a real diminution of the danger of war. If the non-proliferation treaty meets these basic requirements, it may in fact constitute an instrument for strengthening international peace and security and defending the lives of the peoples. Since this concerns all peoples and all anti-imperialist forces, all the countries of the world should take part in the debates on such measures, and the absence of certain countries -- especially of some possessing nuclear weapons -- is likely to hazard the success of non-proliferation. Romania considers that the efforts to prepare a non-proliferation treaty meeting the interests of the general progress of mankind and of international peace must be continued."

40. In conclusion, I would request the Secretariat to arrange for the working paper submitted by the Romanian delegation to be circulated as an official document of the Conference.^{1/}

41. Mr. BURNS (Canada): The representative of Romania has given us a very extensive list of proposed changes and additions to the treaty. My delegation, and I suppose every other delegation, will study them carefully.

42. One point struck me in the proposed changes, and I wonder whether the representative of Romania would be prepared to answer one question now. The point I have in mind is his suggestion to incorporate in the preamble after the sixth paragraph the following new paragraph:

"Affirming the absolute right of all States, whether they possess nuclear weapons or not, to undertake research on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, both now and in the future, on the basis of equality and without any discrimination."

My question is whether it is the intention of the Romanian delegation that those researches for peaceful applications should include so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. It may be that the representative of Romania will not find it convenient to answer now; but we should like some clarification on that point in due course.

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/199.

43. Mr. ECOBESCO (Romania) (translation from French): As I have just said, we are going to provide all explanations of our proposals on a later occasion, and I am sure that the representative of Canada will find in what we shall then say all the necessary clarifications.

44. Mr. TRIVEDI (India): I should like to follow the example of the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, and ask a question which I meant to ask some time ago. I believe that in this Committee the delegations of Nigeria (ENDC/PV.327, para.57) and Ethiopia (ENDC/PV.336, para.48) have suggested that it is essential that the scientists of non-nuclear-weapon countries be given facilities to develop the technology of peaceful nuclear explosions. A reply was given at one time that it was the intention of the nuclear-weapon Powers to help the non-nuclear-weapon Powers to develop the technology of the application and use of peaceful nuclear explosives. To my mind that was not the answer to the original suggestion. While these questions are being asked and answers given, I trust that a specific answer will also be given to the specific question which I have put.

45. The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Before reading the proposed communiqué relating to this meeting, I should like to take this opportunity to extend congratulations to the Soviet Union on its splendid accomplishment in landing an instrumented probe on the planet Venus. We have all become accustomed by now to man's exploits in space, which in a few short years have been such as to stun the imagination; nevertheless this achievement of the Soviet Union is one which merits comment, since not until now has it been possible to make a controlled landing on another planet. It is surely true, in the words of the Vice-President of the United States, that the world's bank of knowledge has been enriched by this latest success in man's attempt to unravel the mysteries of space. Those who have made this contribution can be justly proud, along with all the nations of the earth, which will share in the expanding awareness of the universe we live in.

46. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your congratulations on the great scientific and technical success achieved by my country in effecting the soft landing of an instrument on the planet Venus. We consider that this great achievement of man's intelligence

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should also serve as a call to us to achieve success in solving also the problems facing us here on earth, problems relating to the strengthening of peace and to disarmament, and in particular those problems which our Committee is called upon to solve.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 340th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. A. S. Fisher, representative of the United States.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Romania, Canada, India, the United States and the Soviet Union.

"The delegation of Romania tabled a working paper containing amendments and additions to the draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/199).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 24 October 1967, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.